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david r. nolte* 
Exxon v. Baker: Legislating Spills into the Judiciary: 
How the Supreme Court Sunk Maritime Punitive 
Damages 
In exxon shipping co. v. baker,1 the supreme court of the United States 
considered three issues surrounding the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill: (1) whether in 
maritime law a corporation could be held punitively liable for the reckless actions of 
the ship’s captain; (2) whether federal statute implicitly barred awarding punitive 
damages; and (3) if punitive damages were allowed, whether the $2.5 billion 
awarded by the Ninth Circuit was excessive in accordance with maritime common 
law.2 Justice Alito took no part in the decision of the case.3 As a result of Justice 
Alito’s absence, the Court was evenly split and unable to reach a decision on 
Exxon’s derivative liability, so the Ninth Circuit’s disposition on this issue was 
undisturbed.4 As to the second issue, the Court unanimously held that the federal 
statute does not implicitly bar punitive damages in maritime law.5 However, the 
Justices ruled five-to-three that punitive damages should be limited to a 1:1 ratio as 
a matter of maritime common law.6 By failing to reach a majority on the analysis of 
punitive derivative liability in maritime law, the Court missed an opportunity to 
resolve a circuit split and adopt the Restatement (Second) of Torts (“Restatement”) 
derivative liability rule, as used by the Ninth Circuit.7 Further, the Court should 
have analyzed Exxon’s claim that the punitive damages award was excessive under 

© 2010 David R. Nolte. 
 *  J.D. Candidate, University of Maryland School of Law, May 2010; B.A., Political Science, The George 
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 1. 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008).  
 2. Id. at 2614. 
 3. Id. at 2634; see also Robert Barnes, Justices Assess Financial Damages in Exxon Valdez Case, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 28, 2008, at A2 (noting that Justice Alito recused himself because of his stockholdings in Exxon).  
 4. See infra Part III.A. 
 5. See infra Part III.B. 
 6. See infra Part III.C. 
 7. See infra Part IV.A. 
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the traditional due process standard.8 Rather, the Court framed the punitive 
damages question and analysis solely on maritime common law, paradoxically 
claiming it mandates a 1:1 ratio of compensatory to punitive damages, despite 
maritime case law that suggests judicial deference to Congress, which left punitive 
damages uncapped.9 In so doing, the Court missed an opportunity to address 
confusing due process case law.10 Rather, the Court rendered an outcome-based 
decision by framing the grant of certiorari in a manner that did not consider due 
process and was likely motivated by the majority’s belief that Exxon already paid 
sufficient damages for the 1989 oil spill in other cases.11 Unfortunately, this holding 
will affect future maritime litigation regarding punitive damages resulting from 
egregious or grossly negligent behavior, including BP’s potential liability in the 
recent 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill.12 
i. the case 
In 1989, the oil tanker Exxon Valdez ran aground on Bligh Reef in Alaska’s pristine 
Prince William Sound, spilling millions of gallons of oil into the surrounding 
waters.13 Prior to the accident, the ship’s captain, Joseph Hazelwood, unexpectedly 
left the bridge minutes before the ship was about to make a difficult maneuver.14 
Expert witnesses testified that Hazelwood’s actions were unjustified because his 
absence left only one officer on the bridge when two were required by law, and the 
remaining officer was not certified to navigate the channel.15 Additionally, it was 
later discovered that Hazelwood was intoxicated at the time of the crash16 and that 
Exxon had prior knowledge of his recurring alcohol problem.17 Further, Hazelwood 
ordered the crew to “rock” the tanker in an attempt to free it from the reef, which 
may have caused more oil to spill.18 

 8. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 9. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 10. See infra Part IV.B.4. 
 11. See infra Part IV.B.3. 
 12. See infra Part IV.B.3. 
 13. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2611 (2008).  
 14. Id. at 2612.  
 15. Id. “A special license is needed to navigate the oil tanker [around Bligh Reef] in . . . Prince William 
Sound, and Captain Hazelwood was the only person on board with the license.” In Re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 
1215, 1222 (9th Cir. 2001), vacated, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008) (In re Exxon Valdez I).  
 16. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2613. 
 17. Id. at 2612. There was evidence demonstrating that Hazelwood had previously drank on the job, Exxon 
knew of Hazelwood’s drinking problem, and that some Exxon officials even drank with him. Id. Further, after 
rehabilitation treatment, Hazelwood returned to work for Exxon, and there was no evidence that the company 
monitored his activities. Id.   
 18. Id. at 2613.  
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The disaster required billions of dollars to fund cleanup efforts,19 and Exxon pled 
guilty to violations of various federal statutes such as the Clean Water Act 
(“CWA”)20 and the Refuse Act,21 ultimately paying $125 million in fines and 
restitution damages to the United States government.22 Additionally, Exxon paid 
$900 million “toward restoring natural resources” to the state of Alaska and the 
federal government and “another $303 million in voluntary settlements with 
fishermen, property owners, and other private parties” around Prince William 
Sound.23 The federal district court consolidated all civil cases seeking compensatory 
damages into one action,24 along with thousands of plaintiffs seeking punitive 
damages.25 
The class action suit was organized into three phases:26 the first phase examined 
the recklessness and potential punitive liability of Hazelwood and Exxon; the 
second phase “set compensatory damages for commercial fishermen and Native 
Alaskans;”27 and the third phase “determined the amount of punitive damages for 
which Hazelwood and Exxon were each liable.”28 In the first phase of the trial, the 
district court found that both Hazelwood and Exxon could be punitively liable for 
the accident.29 In the second phase, “the jury awarded $287 million in compensatory 
damages to the commercial fishermen,”30 while most Native Alaskans settled out of 
court.31 In the third phase, the jury granted punitive damages in the amount of 
$5000 against Hazelwood and $5 billion against Exxon.32 

 19. Id.  
 20. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1319(c)(1) (2006). 
 21. 33 U.S.C. §§ 407, 411 (2006). 
 22. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2613. 
 23. Id.  
 24. See id. at 2613. Individual plaintiffs claiming compensatory damages against Exxon were divided into 
three classes including “commercial fishermen, Native Alaskans, and landowners.” Id.  
 25. Id. (“At Exxon’s behest, the court also certified a mandatory class of all plaintiffs seeking punitive 
damages, whose number topped 32,000.”). 
 26. Id.  
 27. Id. A separate civil action by the federal government and the State of Alaska resulted in a payment of 
“$303 million in voluntary settlements with fisherman, property owners, and other private parties.” Id. at 2613. 
 28. Id.  
 29. Id. at 2614. The jury’s instructions regarding corporate liability were: 
[A] corporation is responsible for the reckless acts of those employees who are employed in a 
managerial capacity while acting in the scope of their employment. The reckless act or omission of a 
managerial officer or employee of a corporation, in the course and scope of the performance of his 
duties, is held in law to be the reckless act or omission of the corporation. 
Id. (quoting Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at app. 301a, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008) 
(No. 07-219)). 
 30. Id.  
 31. Id. A majority of the Native Alaskans settled for $20 million out of court, and “those who opted out of 
that settlement ultimately settled for a total of around $2.6 million.” Id.  
 32. Id. The court instructed the jury on the purpose of punitive damages, emphasizing that such damages 
were “designed not to provide compensatory relief but to punish and deter the defendants.” Id.  
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Exxon appealed on various issues to the Ninth Circuit,33 which affirmed the 
jury’s instructions on Exxon’s “corporate liability for acts of managerial agents 
under Circuit precedent.”34 Exxon argued that it could not be held liable for 
punitive damages for Hazelwood’s recklessness.35 Relying on Protectus Alpha 
Navigation Co. v. North Pacific Grain Growers, Inc.,36 the Ninth Circuit rejected this 
assertion and upheld the district court’s decision that Exxon was derivatively or 
vicariously liable for Hazelwood’s actions.37 In Protectus, the Ninth Circuit adopted 
the Restatement’s position on punitive damages and apparent agency, holding that 
a principal can be liable for its agent’s torts “not only where they are authorized, 
ratified or approved [by the principal] and not only where the agent was unfit and 
the principal was reckless in employing him, but also where he was employed in a 
managerial capacity and was acting in the scope of employment.”38 
When determining the amount of punitive damages, the Ninth Circuit 
remanded twice for “adjustments,” relying on Supreme Court due process case law39 
“before ultimately itself remitting the award to $2.5 billion.”40 In October of 2007, 
the Supreme Court granted certiorari41 to consider three questions: (1) the extent of 
Exxon’s corporate liability for Hazelwood’s recklessness, (2) whether federal 
statutory law implicitly barred punitive damages, and (3) whether the $2.5 billion 
punitive award was “excessive” under maritime common law.42 The Supreme Court 
did not grant certiorari on the issue of constitutional due process limitations that 
the lower courts had addressed.43 

 33. Id. Exxon appealed various issues including: the availability of punitive damages, the level of proof 
described in the jury instructions, the sufficiency of evidence for the finding of punitive damages, and the 
amount of punitive damages in proportion to compensatory damages. In re Exxon Valdez I, 270 F.3d 1215, 
1225, 1231, 1238 (9th Cir. 2001), vacated, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008).  
 34. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2614.  
 35. In re Exxon Valdez I, 270 F.3d at 1233.  
 36. 767 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 37. In re Exxon Valdez I, 270 F.3d at 1235. 
 38. Id. (quoting Protectus, 767 F.2d at 1386) (internal quotations omitted). 
 39. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2614 (“[T]he Circuit [court] remanded twice for adjustments in light of this 
Court’s due process cases before ultimately itself remitting the award to $2.5 billion.” (emphasis added)); see, e.g., 
In Re Exxon Valdez I, 270 F.3d at 1246–47; In re Exxon Valdez, 472 F.3d 600, 625 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, Exxon 
Shipping Co. v. Baker 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008) (In re Exxon Valdez II); see also infra Part II.B.  
 40. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2614.  
 41. 552 U.S. 989 (2007). 
 42. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2614.  
 43. See 552 U.S. 989 (2007) (stating that certiorari was granted “limited to Questions 1, 2, and 3(1)”); 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, 21, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008) (No. 07-219) 
(stating that question three part one is whether punitive damages are limited by federal maritime law and 
question three part two is whether punitive damages are limited by constitutional due process). 
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ii. legal background 
The main issues examined in Exxon are derivative liability for punitive damages,44 
due process and maritime limitations on punitive damages,45 and maritime 
common law.46 Specifically, Exxon examined the application of punitive derivative 
liability in maritime cases and the interaction of punitive and compensatory 
damages in maritime law. 
A. Punitive Vicarious Liability in Maritime Law: What Level of Accountability Should 
Apply to Corporations for their Agents? 
It is generally accepted in American law that employers should be held vicariously 
liable for compensatory damages caused by their agents.47 However, the assessment 
of vicarious liability for punitive damages is not as clear because, while the law 
recognizes that employers should have some form of liability for the action of their 
employees, many courts believe that “employers should not be fully exposed to 
vicarious liability for punitive damages.”48 
Assessing punitive damages through vicarious or derivative liability initially 
evolved in English law and was later adopted by American courts in the nineteenth 
century.49 Today, derivative liability for punitive damages is divided among a 
spectrum of rules, ranging from strict liability50 to no liability,51 with modern 
maritime courts taking three mid-ground positions.52 Like land-based law,53 there is 
a split among federal circuits in maritime law over whether to apply the 

 44. See infra Part II.A. 
 45. See infra Part II.B. 
 46. See infra Part II.C. 
 47. See David W. Robertson, Punitive Damages in American Maritime Law, 28 J. MAR. L. & COM. 73, 119 
(1997) (“From the beginning[,] American law has recognized that employers should generally be held 
vicariously liable for compensatory damages resulting from the torts of their employees committed in the 
course and scope of the employment.” (citing Justice Story’s opinion in Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 546 
(1818))). 
 48. Id.  
 49. Deborah Travis, Broker Churning: Who Is Punished? Vicariously Assessed Punitive Damages in the 
Context of Brokerage Houses and Their Agents, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1775, 1792 (1993). 
 50. At one end of the spectrum, courts will find the principal is strictly liable for punitive damages resulting 
from the acts of its agents “regardless of actual authority or ratification.” Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs v. 
Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 575 n.14 (1982) (quoting Mayo Hotel Co. v. Danciger, 288 P. 309 (Okla.1930) 
(internal quotations omitted)). This rule was adopted because “it is in accordance with agency law that holds 
principals liable when their agents commit a tortious act with apparent authority.” Muratore v. M/S Scotia 
Prince, 845 F.2d 347, 354 (1st Cir. 1988).  
 51. On the other end of the spectrum, some courts refuse to find employers liable at all for punitive 
damages resulting from their agent’s actions. See generally, Robertson, supra note 47, at 126–27. 
 52. See id. at 126. 
 53. See Travis, supra note 49, at 1792 (discussing the general split among non-maritime courts on 
vicariously assessing punitive damages). 
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Restatement’s view54 on derivative liability for punitive damages or to use other tests 
that make it more difficult to find corporate liability.55 
The Fifth Circuit, following the Sixth Circuit’s lead,56 adopted the most stringent 
mid-ground rule for vicarious liability in In re P & E Boat Rentals, Inc.,57 requiring 
derivative liability for punitive damages when the corporation “authorizes or ratifies 
wanton actions of an agent,” rather than applying liability merely when an 
employee acts in the scope of his or her employment.58 The Fifth Circuit’s decision 
in P & E Boat Rentals hinged on the lack of evidence that the company’s 
“policymaking officials were aware” of their foreman’s practice, requiring captains 
to travel at high speeds on the Mississippi.59 The discussion of “policymaking” 
officials in P & E Boat Rentals is in accord with the Fifth Circuit’s view that the 
corporation itself, not just its employees, must be “considered the wrongdoer.”60 
The Fifth Circuit based its decision on an early 19th century maritime case,61 The 
Amiable Nancy,62 where the Supreme Court held that owners of a ship could not be 
punitively liable for the wrongdoing of the captain and crew where the owners 
“neither directed . . . nor countenanced . . . nor participated . . .”  in the wrongful 
conduct.63 

 54. The Restatement (Second) of Torts allows punitive damages against a principle by acts of an agent  
only if: 
(a) the principle or a managerial agent authorized the doing and the manner of the act, or (b) the 
agent was unfit and the principal or a managerial agent was reckless in employing or retaining him, 
or (c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the scope of employment, 
or (d) the principal or a managerial agent of the principal ratified or approved the act.  
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 (1977).  
 55. See In Re Exxon Valdez I, 270 F.3d 1215, 1235 n.84 (9th Cir. 2001), vacated, Exxon v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 
2605 (2008) (stating that Fifth and Sixth Circuits rejected Protectus claiming that a principle must ratify the 
actions of an agent for derivative liability); see also Robertson, supra note 47, at 126. 
 56. See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Furhman, 407 F.2d 1143, 1146 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970) 
(denying a vicariously assessed punitive damages award because the captain’s actions were not within 
“authorized procedures dictated by the officials of [the ship owner,] United States Steel”) . 
 57. 872 F.2d 642 (5th Cir. 1989). In P & E Boat Rentals, two crew boats collided in heavy fog on the 
Mississippi River, killing and injuring passengers. Id. at 644–45. The district court found that the captain of one 
of the boats was negligent for not having a valid Coast Guard license, operating a vessel at excessive speed, and 
failing to monitor the radar and use proper signals. Id. at 646.   
 58. Id. at 650 (emphasis added); see also id. at 652.  
 59. Id. at 652–53. 
 60. Id. at 652 (“In such a case [where employees acted on their own], the corporation itself cannot be 
considered the wrongdoer. If the corporation has formulated policies and directed its employees properly, no 
purpose would be served by imposing punitive damages against it except to increase the amount of the 
judgment.”). 
 61. Id. at 650–51 (citing The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 546 (1818)).  
 62. 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 546 (1818). In Amiable Nancy, the ship-owner of The Scourge, who was not on the 
voyage, was only liable for compensatory damages and not for “vindictive damages” when The Scourge’s crew 
plundered another ship. Id. at 546–47, 559. 
 63. Id. at 559. Further, the Fifth Circuit stated that the Supreme Court later affirmed Amiable Nancy in the 
1893, non-maritime case, Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Co. v. Prentice. See P & E Boat Rentals, 872 
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Yet, other federal circuits have different tests to determine maritime derivative 
liability.64 The First Circuit adopted a qualified version of the Restatement in CEH, 
Inc. v. F/V Seafarer.65 To find derivative liability under the First Circuit test, the 
agent must be employed in a managerial capacity and have acted in the scope of 
employment, and the principal must have “some level of culpability for the 
[agent’s] misconduct.”66 The First Circuit required this “some level of culpability” 
standard because of its concern that under a strict reading of the Restatement, a 
principal could be held liable where its managerial agent was acting within the 
scope of his or her employment, but by no fault of the employer.67 While the First 
Circuit did not specifically define its standard of “some level of culpability” in CEH, 
the court determined that the employer met this standard of culpability because 
“[n]ot only was there a complete delegation of authority in a troublesome work 
situation, but also a complete absence of any policy directive, written or oral.”68 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit adopted the Restatement’s69 view of punitive vicarious 
liability in Protectus.70 In Protectus, the Ninth Circuit held that in a maritime case, a 
principal may be liable for punitive damages resulting from the actions of a reckless 
agent or actions of a manager within the scope of his or her employment.71 The 
Ninth Circuit explained that the Restatement “better reflects the reality of modern 

F.2d at 651 (“Seventy-four years later, the Supreme Court affirmed these punitive damage principles in Lake           
Shore . . . .” (citing Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101 (1893))). 
 64. See In re Exxon Valdez I, 270 F.3d 1215, 1235 n.84 (9th Cir. 2001), vacated, Exxon Shipping Co. v. 
Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008) (discussing various federal circuit approaches to punitive derivative liability); see 
also Robertson, supra note 47, at 126. 
 65. 70 F.3d 694 (1st Cir. 1995). In CEH, a lobster vessel owner, CEH, sued a fishing boat, her two captains, 
and her owner for disturbing CEH’s lobster traps on the sea floor. Id. at 696–67. The fishing vessel, one captain, 
and the owner were found liable, and the court awarded compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 697–98. 
The First Circuit found vicarious punitive liability in the owner of the fishing boat for “failure to provide any 
supervision over his captains” and because the captain of the boat had “complete managerial discretion over the 
means and methods of fishing.” Id. at 705.  
 66. Id. at 705.  
 67. Id. Other maritime statutes also include a culpability requirement. See, e.g., Limitation of Shipowners’ 
Liability (Limitation) Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30505 (2006). “The [Limitation] Act allows a vessel owner to limit 
liability for damage or injury, occasioned without the owner’s privity or knowledge, to the value of the vessel or 
the owner’s interest in the vessel.” Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 446 (2001). Justice Stevens 
noted Exxon did not attempt to argue that the Limitation Act applied because of the difficulty it would face 
alleging that Captain Hazelwood’s actions were not within the company’s “privity or knowledge.” Exxon 
Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2635–36 & n.3 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting) 
(discussing application of the Limitation Act).  
 68. CEH, 70 F.3d. at 705. 
 69. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 54.  
 70. Protectus Alpha Navigation Co. v. N. Pac. Grain Growers, Inc., 767 F.2d 1379, 1386 (9th Cir. 1985).  
 71. Id. The shipowner of the Protectus sued dock-owner, North Pacific, when North Pacific’s managerial 
employee ordered the ship cast-off from its dock while a fire was being fought aboard the Protectus. Id. at 1381–
82. The court held that by casting the Protectus off from the dock, the North Pacific employee prevented the fire 
department from putting the fire out. Id. at 1381–82. The court found the dock-owner negligent per se as well as 
liable for punitive damages under the Restatement. Id. at 1382, 1387.  
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corporate America,”72 emphasizing that “a corporation can act only through its 
agents and employees, and that no reasonable distinction can be made between the 
guilt of the employee in a managerial capacity acting within the scope of his 
employment and the guilt of the corporation.”73 
State courts are also split on this issue, with some states requiring corporate 
approval or ratification,74 other states adopting versions of the Restatement,75and a 
few states holding “employers liable for punitive damages on even broader 
grounds.”76 
B. Punitive Damages: Historical Origins and Due Process Considerations 
Punitive damages are as ancient as the law itself and can be traced back to 2000 
B.C.77 The theory of punitive damages has continued to be relevant throughout 
history78 with authorities calling for punitive-like penalties when there were “certain 
especially harmful acts.”79 Such punishment damages were first explicitly recognized 
in England, when fines could be imposed “for more than the injury received” and 
were later adopted into American common law.80 Historically, various theories have 
been promulgated for the purpose of punitive damages,81 but today, most scholars 
agree that punitive damages are primarily for retribution and deterrence.82 The 
courts have awarded punitive damages in maritime law “where a defendant is 
shown to have engaged in willful and wanton conduct.”83 Historically, punitive 
damages served as an extra form of compensation in maritime law, because 

 72. Id. at 1386.  
 73. Id. 
 74. See id. at 1386 (noting the division of authority on derivative liability and that a “majority of courts . . .  
have held corporations liable for punitive damages imposed because of the acts of their agents, in the absence of 
approval or ratification” (quoting Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 575 n.14 
(1982)) (internal quotations omitted)). 
 75. See Hydrolevel, 456 U.S. at 575 n.14. For example, Idaho, Colorado, California, and Oklahoma follow 
the Restatement. Id.  
 76. See Protectus, 767 F.2d at 1387.  
 77. See Joseph A. Seiner, The Failure of Punitive Damages in Employment Discrimination Cases: A Call for 
Change, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 735, 742–43 (2008). 
 78. Id. at 743. 
 79. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2620 (2008); see also Seiner, supra note 77, at 742–43 
(discussing the progression of punitive damages throughout history). 
 80. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2620. (quoting Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498 (K.B.)); Seiner, supra 
note 77, at 743–44. 
 81. See Seiner, supra note 77, at 743. 
 82. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003) (“[P]unitive damages serve a 
broader function [than compensatory damages]; they are aimed at deterrence and retribution.”). 
 83. See In re P & E Boat Rentals, Inc., 872 F.2d 642, 650 (5th Cir. 1989). 
NOLTE.PP3.DOC 6/14/2010 6:07 PM 
 David R. Nolte 
vol. 5 no. 2 2010 385 
significant compensatory damages for certain intangible injuries like pure economic 
loss or emotional distress were not always available in maritime law.84 
Prior to Exxon, the Supreme Court affirmed the use of vicarious punitive 
damages85 and had only restricted the amount of punitive damages in maritime law 
if it represented a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment or Fifth Amendment due 
process clauses.86 Though the Supreme Court would later provide more guidelines 
for determining the amount of punitive awards in all due process limitation cases, 
the Court first emphasized its refusal to set a bright line rule,87 which was reflected 
in maritime decisions by lower courts.88 After the Court espoused its first due 
process analysis guidelines for all due process cases in 1996, courts applied these due 
process guidelines to determine whether punitive damages were excessive in 
maritime cases.89 
The Court first outlined detailed guidelines for analyzing the constitutionality of 
punitive damages in the 1996 case BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore.90 Here, the 
Supreme Court held that where compensatory damages totaled $4000, a $2 million 
punitive damages award violated both substantive and procedural due process.91 
The majority opinion rested its conclusion primarily on procedural due process, 

 84. See, e.g., Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2636 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting) (“General maritime law 
limits the availability of compensatory damages.”); Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 
U.S. 424, 437 n.11 (2001) (stating that before the types of available compensatory damages “broadened,” 
punitive damages were historically used in courts to compensate for intangible injuries); Gough v. Natural Gas 
Pipeline Co. of America, 996 F.2d 763, 765 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating that compensatory damages for emotional 
distress under maritime law will only be awarded when the plaintiff demonstrates there was physical impact or 
injury); Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1985) (“[C]laims for economic 
loss unaccompanied by physical damage to a proprietary interest [a]re not recoverable in maritime tort.”). 
 85. See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 15 (1991) (holding that punitive respondeat superior 
liability of a corporation for the actions of an employee, and in the absence of any wrongdoing by the 
corporation, was not a violation of the corporation’s due process). Specifically, the Haslip Court stated that 
finding a corporation liable for its agent’s wrongdoing in the scope of his or her employment without 
wrongdoing by the corporation “is not fundamentally unfair and does not in itself violate the Due Process 
Clause.” Id. 
 86. See U.S. CONST. amend. V, amend. XIV, §1; Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2619, 2626; Brief in Opposition at 28–
29, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008) (No. 07-219). 
 87. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18 (“We need not, and indeed we cannot, draw a mathematical bright line 
between the constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable that would fit every case. . . . 
[H]owever, . . . general concerns of reasonableness and adequate guidance from the court when the case is tried 
to a jury properly enter into the constitutional calculus.”). 
 88. See CEH Inc. v. F/V Seafarer, 70 F.3d 694, 705–06 (1st Cir. 1995) (affirming punitive awards of $10,000 
and $50,000 in a maritime case, even though compensatory damages were less than $7,000). 
 89. See, e.g., Silivanch v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 241, 262–63 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (declining to 
overrule a punitive damages award of $7 million in a maritime case as excessive when the court awarded $2.6 
million in compensatory damages). In Silivanch, the court determined a cruise line was negligent for an 
outbreak of Legionnaires Disease, a type of pneumonia, on its ship. Id. at 250, 262–63. 
 90. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).  
 91. Id. at 585–86. The wrongdoing consisted of BMW’s decision not to inform dealers of pre-delivery 
damage to vehicles, which amounted to necessary repairs totaling less than three percent of the vehicle’s value. 
Id. at 562–63. The lower court awarded the respondent $4,000 in compensatory damages, reflecting the 
diminished value of a “repainted BMW” and $2 million in punitive damages for BMW’s concealment. Id. 
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emphasizing the right to notice of potential liability or criminality.92 The Gore Court 
outlined three “guideposts” to help determine the permissible extent of punitive 
damages including: (1) “the degree of reprehensibility,” (2) “the disparity between 
the harm or potential harm” and the punitive damages award, and (3) “the 
difference between this remedy and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in 
comparable cases.”93 Additionally, the Court recognized a need for a “higher ratio” 
of punitive to compensatory damages where “the injury is hard to detect or the 
monetary value of noneconomic harm might have been difficult to determine.”94 
Declining to set forth a bright-line test, the Supreme Court has struggled with 
the ratio of compensatory damages to punitive damages. In 2003, the Supreme 
Court again struck down punitive damages on due process grounds in State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell.95 The Court held that damages were 
excessive when $145 million was awarded punitively with only $1 million awarded 
for compensation.96 Using the guideposts from Gore, the Court emphasized that 
“few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory 
damages to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.”97 The Court refused to 
state or apply a specific formula to determine punitive damages.98 
More recently, in 2008, the Fourth Circuit held in EEOC v. Federal Express 
Corp.99 that a punitive damages award for the violation of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (“ADA”) was constitutional even though it was 12.5 times the 
compensatory damages award.100 Specifically, the court recognized that the ratio is 
only one aspect of the Gore guideposts and found the award was reasonable because 
it was well within the ADA statutory $300,000 cap on total damages.101 
Additionally, the Court has struggled with considering harm to others in the 
“degree of reprehensibility” guidepost. In 2007, the Supreme Court addressed due 
process concerns about punitive damages in the context of a cigarette smoker’s 
death in Philip Morris USA v. Williams.102 In a five-to-four decision, the Williams 
Court decided that punitive damages awarded, even in part, to punish for harm to 
non-parties is a violation of the due process clause and therefore unconstitutional.103 

 92. Id. at 574. 
 93. Id. at 575.  
 94. Id. at 582. 
 95. 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
 96. Id. at 412, 418. 
 97. Id. at 425.  
 98. Id. (“We decline again to impose a bright-line ratio which a punitive damages award cannot exceed.”). 
 99. 513 F.3d 360 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 100. Id. at 377–78.  
 101. Id. at 378 (“[T]he punitive damages award was plainly reasonable in light of at least three relevant 
factors: reprehensibility, proportionality, and the statutory cap.”). 
 102. 549 U.S. 346 (2007). Decedent’s estate sued Philip Morris, claiming that Philip Morris’ conduct misled 
decedent into thinking cigarette smoking was safe. Id. at 349–50. 
 103. Id. at 353. 
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However, the Court further confused104 the issue by stating that it is permissible to 
address harm to others in the Gore reprehensibility guidepost.105 
Thus, while it seems clear that the Supreme Court has set some due process 
limitations on punitive damages, the Court has never set a specific ratio or limit on 
punitive damages. 
C. Maritime Law and Damages 
Maritime law, also known as admiralty law,106 is predominantly judge-made law and 
within the federal court’s jurisdiction,107 but Congress also has the power to create 
or change maritime law through legislation so long as its actions comport with the 
Constitution.108 The federal courts were given jurisdiction over maritime law in 
Article III of the Constitution.109 Federal courts are allowed to “draw on the 
substantive law inherent in the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and to 
continue the development of this law within constitutional limits.”110 The Supreme 
Court has recognized its role in maritime litigation, stating that “the Judiciary has 
traditionally taken the lead in formulating flexible and fair remedies in the law 

 104. See Wendy Rose Parcells, A Monumental Decision or Just an Environmental Catastrophe? An In-Depth 
Look at the Ramifications and Shortcomings of the U.S. Supreme Court Decision in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 
16 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 25 (2008) (“[T]he Williams [sic] decision is imprecise and left uncertainty and 
confusion as to how a jury is to be instructed . . . . The Supreme Court’s holding was contradictory.”).  
 105. Williams, 549 U.S. at 355. Specifically, the Court stated: 
Evidence of actual harm to nonparties can help to show that the conduct that harmed the plaintiff 
also posed a substantial risk of harm to the general public, and so was particularly reprehensible—
although counsel may argue in a particular case that conduct resulting in no harm to others 
nonetheless posed a grave risk to the public, or the converse. Yet . . . a jury may not go further than 
this and use a punitive damages verdict to punish a defendant directly on account of harms it is 
alleged to have visited on nonparties.  
Id.  
 106. See Debra D. Burke, Cruise Lines and Consumers: Troubled Waters, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 689, 694 & n.30 
(2000) (stating that although the Constitution refers to all cases of “admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,” that 
the words “‘admiralty’ and ‘maritime’ are almost synonymous,” with “maritime” reflecting a more general term 
not limited to the law). 
 107. Id. at 694 (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2); see also Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2619 
(2008) (recognizing that maritime law is largely judge-made (quoting Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale 
Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 259 (1979))).  
 108. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 55 (1932) (“In amending and revising the maritime laws, the 
Congress cannot reach beyond the constitutional limits which are inherent in the admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2619 (noting that maritime law is largely 
common law but subject to Congress’ authority “to legislate otherwise if it disagrees with the judicial result”). 
 109. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (extending federal appellate court jurisdiction to “all Cases of admiralty and 
maritime Jurisdiction”). 
 110. See Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 361 (1959) (internal quotations and 
citations omitted); see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
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maritime, and ‘Congress has largely left to this Court the responsibility for 
fashioning the controlling rules of admiralty law.’”111 
Yet, despite the Supreme Court’s influence in this area of law, there are many 
maritime statutes.112 For example, the courts are required to look to the Jones Act 
when determining tort damages available to a decedent sailor.113 Through the 
Limitations Act, Congress explicitly limited the derivative liability of ship-owners if 
the employee’s wrongdoing was not within the ship-owner’s “privity or 
knowledge.”114 Most importantly, there are no maritime statutes explicitly limiting 
the size of punitive damages in a derivative liability case,115 and prior to Exxon, the 
Court had never considered limitations on the size of punitive damages within 
maritime common law.116 
iii. the court’s reasoning 
In Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, the United States Supreme Court was split equally 
in its ruling on derivative liability; thus, the Ninth Circuit’s decision on apparent 
agency remained undisturbed.117 However, the Court unanimously118 held that 

 111. See United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 409 (1975) (citing Fitzgerald v. U.S. Lines Co., 
374 U.S. 16, 20 (1963)). 
 112. See, e.g., Jones Act (Merchant Marine Act of 1920), Pub. L. No. 66-261, 41 Stat. 988 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 46 U.S.C.); The Limitation Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30505 (2006) (imposing a general 
limit of liability on vessel owners); Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act (TAPPA), 43 U.SC. §§ 1651–1655 
(2006). 
 113. See, e.g., Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 36 (stating that the court must look to the Jones Act 
to determine the extent of damages available to a decedent sailor, since the Act “limits recovery to losses 
suffered during the decedent’s lifetime” (citing Act of Mar. 4, 1915, ch. 250, 41 Stat. 1007 (1920) (current 
version at 46 U.S.C. §§ 30104–05 (2006)))).  
 114. The Limitation Act, 46 U.S.C. 30505(b) (2006); Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 439 
(2001) (“The Limitation Act allows a vessel owner to limit liability for damage or injury, occasioned without the 
owner’s privity or knowledge, to the value of the vessel or the owner’s interest in the vessel.”). The Supreme 
Court in Exxon recognized that Exxon did not attempt to argue the Limitation Act applied because of the 
difficulty it would face alleging Captain Hazelwood’s actions were not within the company’s “privity or 
knowledge.” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2635–36 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring and 
dissenting) (discussing application of the Limitation Act).  
 115. See Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2635 (“In light of the many statutes governing liability under admiralty law, the 
absence of any limitation on an award of the sort at issue in this case suggests that Congress would not wish use 
to create a new rule restricting the liability of a wrongdoer like Exxon.”). 
 116. See id. at 2619–20 (majority opinion) (“Exxon raises an issue of first impression about punitive 
damages in maritime law . . . . [Exxon] argue[s] that this award exceeds the bounds justified by the punitive 
damages goal of deterring reckless (or worse) behavior and the consequently heightened threat of harm.”); Brief 
in Opposition, supra note 86, at 29.  
 117. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2616 (stating that if a court is equally split, there can be no order and no reversal 
(citing Durant v. Essex Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 107 (1869))). Noting that the Court was equally divided, Justice 
Souter held that it would “leave the Ninth Circuit’s opinion undisturbed,” and thus the derivative liability 
decision is not precedential. Id. There were only eight Justices presiding because Justice Alito, an owner of 
Exxon stock, took no part in the decision of the case. Id. at 2634; A Punitive Ruling: Supreme Court Strayed 
When It Reduced Damages Paid to Exxon Valdez Oil-Spill Victims, HOUS. CHRON., June 30, 2008, at B6.  
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statutory law did not implicitly bar punitive damages119 and ruled in a five-to-
three120 decision that the $2.5 billion award against Exxon should be reduced to no 
more than the compensatory damages for the case under maritime common law.121 
A. An Evenly Split Court Left the Ninth Circuit’s Ruling on Exxon’s Derivative 
Liability Undisturbed 
The Justices could not align a majority on the issue of whether maritime law allows 
derivative liability of a principal for a captain’s actions.122 Exxon argued, in line with 
the Fifth and Sixth Circuit,123 that maritime precedent barred application of 
derivative liability to the ship-owner by citing two nineteenth century cases that 
held that punitive damages are not available against a ship-owner for a captain’s 
recklessness without the ship-owner’s explicit ratification.124 Baker countered that 
the Restatement should prevail, citing the Ninth Circuit decision in the instant case 
and Protectus,125 while distinguishing Exxon’s cases.126 The Restatement permits 
“corporate liability in punitive damages for reckless acts of managerial employees” 
acting within the scope of their employment.127 Since the Justices were at a 
stalemate, the Court left the Ninth Circuit’s judgment undisturbed, finding Exxon 
liable, and stated that this ruling was not precedential.128 

 118. Justice Souter’s opinion holding that statutory provisions did not bar punitive damages was joined by 
Justices Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2611. Justices Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer 
concurred regarding statutory preemption, but dissented in the Court’s holding on reducing the punitive 
damages. See id.  
 119. Id. at 2619.  
 120. Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented in the Court’s holding on reducing the punitive 
damages. Id. at 2634 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting); id. at 2639 (Ginsburg, J., concurring and 
dissenting); id. at 2640 (Breyer, J., concurring and dissenting).  
 121. Id. at 2634 (majority opinion).  
 122. Id. at 2616.  
 123. See supra Part II.A. 
 124. Exxon first relied on The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 546 (1818), for establishing that ship-
owners are not derivatively liable. Id. at 2614–15. Furthermore, Exxon said the principle was affirmed in a later 
case, Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Co. v. Prentice, where in a tort action against a railroad company, 
the Court held that an employer is only liable for compensatory damages, and not punitive awards. Id. at 2615–
16 (citing Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101 (1893)).  
 125. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2616 (citing Protectus Alpha Navigation Co. v. N. Pac. Grain Growers, Inc., 767 
F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that the Restatement rule on derivative liability for punitive damages is the 
law in the Ninth Circuit)).  
 126. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2616. Exxon relied on the Fifth and Sixth Circuit line of cases, Amiable Nancy and 
Lake Shore, disclaiming any derivative punitive liability. See supra note 123; supra Part II.A. Baker claimed that 
Amiable Nancy was only dicta “because punitive damages were not at issue” and that Lake Shore “merely 
rejected company liability for the acts of a railroad conductor, while saying nothing about liability for agents 
higher up the ladder, like ship captains.” Id. 
 127. Exxon, 128 S.Ct. at 2616 (citing 4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909(c) (1977)).  
 128. Id. 
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B. The Court Unanimously Agreed that Federal Statutory Law Does Not Preempt 
Punitive Damages 
Exxon argued that the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) barred any punitive damages 
available at common law.129 The Ninth Circuit rejected this claim on the merits130 
and the Supreme Court affirmed this assertion on both procedural and substantive 
grounds.131 Though the Supreme Court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning 
in reaching its decision on procedural grounds,132 the circuit decision did not turn 
on the procedural issue, so the Court found that the Ninth Circuit did not abuse its 
discretion.133 
The Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s decision on the merits, finding that 
because Congress was silent on the availability of punitive damages in the CWA, 
common law was not preempted.134 The Court was not persuaded that the CWA, “a 
statute expressly geared to protecting ‘water,’ ‘shorelines,’ and ‘natural resources’ 
was intended to eliminate sub silentio oil companies’ common law duties to refrain 
from injuring the bodies and livelihoods of private individuals.”135 Thus, the Court, 
having already affirmed by way of a split decision the Ninth Circuit’s finding of 
common law derivative liability, found that the federal statute did not preempt 
punitive damages in maritime law.136 
C. A Closely Divided Court Restricted Punitive Damages to a 1:1 Ratio with 
Compensatory Damages 
Next, the Court determined the appropriate ratio of punitive to compensatory 
damages. Unlike the Ninth Circuit and district court’s analysis that confronted due 
process restrictions on punitive damages, the Supreme Court only granted 
certiorari on the question of whether maritime common law restricted the ratio of 

 129. Id.  
 130. In re Exxon Valdez I, 270 F.3d 1215, 1231 (9th Cir. 2001), vacated, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. 
Ct. 2605 (2008). 
 131. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2616, 2618. 
 132. Id. at 2616–18. The district court rejected the defendant’s claim that the Trans-Alaska Pipeline 
Authorization Act preempted punitive damages. Id. at 2616–17. After the district court’s decision, Exxon filed a 
motion “almost thirteen months after the stipulated motions deadline,” arguing that two recent cases 
demonstrated that the rule on punitive damages in maritime law was “displaced by federal statutes, including 
the CWA.” Id. at 2617. The district court denied this motion, but Exxon raised it again in the Ninth Circuit. Id. 
While the Ninth Circuit recognized the lateness of Exxon’s motion, it held that it should not be denied on 
procedural grounds because “Exxon had consistently argued statutory preemption throughout the litigation, 
and the question was of massive . . . significance.” Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted). The Supreme 
Court disagreed, stating that the defendant’s motion was not timely, but ultimately left the discretion of the 
Ninth Circuit intact because the ruling did not affect the outcome of the case. Id. at 2618 n.6.  
 133. Id. (“We do have to say, though, that . . . if the case turned on the propriety of the Circuit’s decision to 
reach the preemption issue we would take up the claim that it exceeded its discretion.”).  
 134. Id. at 2618–19. 
 135. Id. at 2619. 
 136. Id. at 2618. 
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punitive to compensatory damages and did not undertake a constitutional analysis 
using due process case law.137 Exxon argued that maritime common law prevented 
an award of this magnitude138 for punitive damages, stating that the “award 
exceed[ed] the bounds justified by the punitive damages goal of deterring reckless 
(or worse) behavior and the consequently heightened threat of harm.”139 The Court 
ultimately agreed, restricting punitive damages to a 1:1 ratio with compensatory 
damages.140 
The majority compared the use of punitive damages in various states and 
nations, and determined that many states have imposed statutory limits141 on 
punitive damages and that the United States has a higher and more frequent rate of 
punitive awards than any other country.142 The majority then distinguished Exxon 
from “constitutional level” cases that discussed the “due process standards that 
every award must pass.”143 Justice Souter, writing for the majority, noted that 
although the Court refused to set a hard-line formula in the due process cases, “‘few 
awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, 
to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.’”144 
However, Justice Souter explained that such due process cases differed from the 
case sub judice because this review only dealt with maritime common law, “which 
precedes and should obviate any application of the constitutional standard.”145 The 
Court stated that the due process cases originated out of state common law and 
thus provided federal review only on the constitutional issue.146 However, the Court 
in the instant case was not considering the intersection of punitive damages and due 
process, but rather the regulation of punitive damages in maritime law, over which 
the federal courts have jurisdiction.147 Thus, in the absence of any statute, the 
responsibility of determining punitive damages in maritime common law is in the 
Court’s discretion since maritime law is regulated by federal courts.148 Specifically, 

 137. See supra note 43; see also Brief in Opposition, supra note 86, at 29. 
 138. The award issued by the Ninth Circuit was $2.5 billion. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2614.  
 139. Id. at 2619–20. 
 140. Id. at 2634. 
 141. Id. at 2623–25. The Court noted that many states have put a monetary cap or ratio cap on punitive 
damages based on the ratio between punitive and compensatory damages. Id. at 2623. 
 142. Id.  
 143. Id. at 2626 (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003)). 
 144. Id. (quoting State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425).  
 145. Id. at 2626. The Court noted that constitutional due process cases have dealt with awards subject to 
state law restrictions, whereas in this case, the court deals with the intersection of federal maritime law at 
common law. Id.  
 146. Id. (“[T]he only matter of federal law within . . . [the Court’s previous due process cases] appellate 
authority was the constitutional due process issue.”). 
 147. Id.  
 148. Id. at 2626–27 (“Our review of punitive damages today, then, considers not their intersection with the 
Constitution, but the desirability of regulating them as a common law remedy for which responsibility lies with 
this Court as a source of judge-made law in the absence of statute.”). 
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Justice Souter noted that while Congress maintains “superior authority” in 
maritime law, legislative inaction did not prohibit the Court from setting a 
limitation.149 
Next, the Court created a standard for limiting punitive damages in a maritime 
case. Because the Court stated that it had jurisdiction to review this case under 
maritime common law and not due process standards, the Court did not use the 
guideposts established in the due process cases.150 Rather, the Court first listed the 
goals of punitive damages, stating that the award must be “reasonably predictable” 
and not “excessive.”151 The majority then considered the different ways of 
determining the appropriateness of damages, by looking at various state methods,152 
and analyzing both verbal and quantitative tests.153 Ultimately, the Court decided 
that quantitative tests were the superior method.154 
Specifically, the Court stated that a ratio between punitive and compensatory 
damages was the most effective means of determining the reasonableness of 
punitive damages.155 Noting that few states have a ratio higher than 3:1, the majority 
considered whether a 3:1, a 2:1, or a 1:1 ratio would be best.156 Justice Souter 
reasoned that a 3:1 ratio was inappropriate because states usually enact such harsh 
ratios for “cases involving some of the most egregious conduct, including malicious 
behavior and dangerous activity carried on for the purpose of increasing a 
tortfeasor’s financial gain,” as opposed to the facts in Exxon’s case, which, the 
majority stated, did not rise to the level of malicious conduct.157 The majority also 
rejected a 2:1 ratio (treble damages), stating that it applied in areas of law vastly 
different from maritime law, particularly where private suits are rare and thus 
require inducement to supplement governmental enforcement, but that such 

 149. Id. at 2630 n.21. Justice Souter explained that “[w]here there is a need for a new remedial maritime 
rule, past precedent argues for our setting a judicially derived standard, subject of course to congressional 
revision.” Id.  
 150. Id.  
 151. Id. at 2627.  
 152. Justice Souter explained that the Court’s analysis was based on maritime common law, and not the 
constitutional boundaries considered in other Supreme Court due process cases. Id. at 2626–27. To aid its 
analysis, the Court then examined various state court analyses, based on state common law as guidance for how 
maritime common law should consider its punitive damage limits, separate from the due process analysis. Id. at 
2627–28. The Court explained that previous Supreme Court due process cases have considered state common 
law before constitutional considerations, but, ultimately, “could provide no occasion to consider a common-
law standard of excessiveness.” Id. (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 279 (1989) 
(internal quotations omitted)).  
 153. Id. at 2627. For example, the Court described verbal tests such as Maryland’s “nonexclusive list of nine 
review factors” such as “degree of heinousness” and the value of deterrence, as well as Alabama’s factors 
including “actual or likely harm” and whether the defendant made a profit off of the harm. Id. at 2627–28. 
Quantitative methods described include ratios or caps. Id. at 2629. 
 154. Id. at 2629. 
 155. Id.  
 156. Id. at 2631–33. 
 157. Id. at 2631–32. 
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inducement was not needed here.158 Ultimately, the Court ruled that a 1:1 ratio was 
appropriate, because the median of punitive damages in similar civil cases was 
below this 1:1 standard.159 Also, the Court wanted to protect against “awards that 
are unpredictable and unnecessary.”160 
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred, supporting the holding as 
consistent with prior case law such as State Farm, but also stating his disagreement 
with the outcome of those cases.161 
Justin Stevens concurred with the Court’s ruling on derivative liability and 
federal statutory preemption.162 However, he dissented on the issue of the ratio of 
punitive to compensatory damages.163 Specifically, he argued that the Court should 
not impose restrictions on punitive damages where Congress had not, and that 
there should be an abuse of discretion review standard.164 Justice Stevens stated that 
while a large proportion of maritime law is judge-made, a large component of it is 
also statutory, so the legislature should determine any limits on damages.165 He 
argued that because Congress chose not to limit punitive damages, the Court 
should not proactively do so,166 nor should it “overstep the well-considered 
boundaries imposed by federal legislation.”167 Specifically, Justice Stevens examined 
current statutes that demonstrated Congress’s ability, yet reluctance to limit 
punitive damages.168 Further, Justice Stevens stated that maritime law generally 
limits compensatory damages, which may be why Congress chose not to limit 
punitive awards.169 Justice Stevens further noted that caps and ratios are typically 
imposed legislatively and the majority could not cite any state court decision that 
“imposed a precise ratio” as the majority did here.170 

 158. Id. at 2632. 
 159. Id. at 2633. 
 160. Id.  
 161. Id. at 2634 (Scalia, J., concurring). In Gore, Scalia wrote “the Due Process Clause provides no 
substantive protections against ‘excessive’ or ‘unreasonable’ awards of punitive damages.” BMW of N. Am., Inc. 
v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 598–99 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).   
 162. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2634 (Stevens, J. concurring and dissenting).  
 163. Id. at 2634–35. 
 164. Id. at 2635.  
 165. See id. at 2634–35.  
 166. Id. at 2635. 
 167. Id. at 2635 (quoting Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 27 (1990) (internal quotations omitted).  
 168. Id. at 2635. Justice Stevens argued that Exxon’s case did not fall within the purview of the Limitations 
Act, which limited the liability of a ship-owner if there was no wrongdoing within the ship-owner’s “privity or 
knowledge.” Id. at 2635. Additionally, Justice Stevens cited the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, which 
restricted certain damages, but explicitly did not restrict punitive awards. Id. at 2636.  
 169. Id. at 2636–37. 
 170. Id. at 2637. The majority responded to Justice Stevens’ criticism, claiming that the legislature has 
“largely left to this Court the responsibility for fashioning the controlling rules for admiralty law.” Id. at 2630 
n.21 (majority opinion). Justice Souter argued that where a new rule is needed in maritime law, precedent 
points to “setting a judicially derived standard, subject of course to congressional revision.” Id. 
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Justice Ginsburg dissented in the Court’s ruling regarding the ratio as well, 
arguing that while the Court has the power to make a restriction, it should refrain 
from doing so.171 Justice Breyer also dissented, arguing that while he recognized the 
need to limit punitive awards, the Exxon case was especially egregious and 
warranted an award above the Court’s ruling of a 1:1 ratio.172 
iv. analysis 
By failing to reach a majority on how derivative liability in maritime law should be 
applied, the Court missed an opportunity to adopt, with precedential effect, the 
Restatement rule on derivative liability.173 Furthermore, the Court should have 
analyzed the punitive damages award under due process case law because maritime 
law had only ever considered this constitutional limitation.174 The Supreme Court 
usurped the legislature’s role and created a new rule in maritime common law 
restricting punitive damages to a 1:1 ratio with compensatory damages.175 The Court 
did this despite Congress having set no limits on punitive damages in maritime 
derivative liability cases and maritime common law, which suggests courts should 
defer to Congress.176 The Court preempted analysis of due process limitations by 
granting certiorari only to assess maritime common law limitations on punitive 
damages, and may have been motivated to enact such a strict ratio to prevent Exxon 
from having to pay any more damages for the 1989 oil spill.177 By creating an 
arbitrary new standard, the Court missed an opportunity to clarify the existing due 
process guidelines.178 
A. Missing the Boat on Derivative Liability 
By failing to reach a majority on the question of how punitive derivative liability 
should be applied in maritime cases,179 the Supreme Court failed to fully resolve an 
issue on which the circuits are split.180 Without guidance from the Supreme Court, 
the circuit courts have promulgated three interpretations of when to apply punitive 

 171. Id. at 2639 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). She stated that there was no “urgent need in maritime law to 
break away from the ‘traditional common law approach under which punitive damages are determined by a 
properly instructed jury, followed by trial-court, and then appellate-court review, to ensure that [the award] is 
reasonable.’” Id. (quoting Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 15 (1991) (alteration in original)).  
 172. Id. at 2640 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 173. See infra Part IV.A. 
 174. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 175. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 176. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 177. See infra Part IV.B.3. 
 178. See infra Part IV.B.4. 
 179. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2616 (2008) (describing the Court’s inability to reach 
a majority on derivative liability and thus leaving the Ninth Circuit’s decision undisturbed); see also supra Part 
III.A. 
 180. See supra Part II.A. 
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derivative liability in maritime law, including: 1) the Ninth Circuit’s adoption of the 
Restatement; 2) the Fifth and Sixth Circuit’s application of Nancy; and 3) the First 
Circuit’s qualified Restatement rule.181 
The Court should have adopted the Restatement rule, as applied in Protectus, 
which states that a principal may be liable for the actions of a manager acting within 
the scope of his or her employment.182 As the Ninth Circuit observed in Protectus, 
the Restatement “better reflects the reality of modern corporate America,”183 
because “a corporation can only act through its agents and employees.”184 With 
growing globalization and increasing use of the corporate structure, “no reasonable 
distinction can be made between the guilt of the employee in a managerial capacity 
acting within the scope of his employment and the guilt of the corporation.”185 The 
Fifth and Sixth Circuit rule requiring ratification by the corporation186 and the First 
Circuit’s qualification of culpability are thus outdated and difficult to satisfy in the 
modern corporate world because “no corporate executive or director would 
approve the egregious acts to which punitive damages would attach,” thus plaintiffs 
could only ever recover compensatory damages.187 
Furthermore, scholars and the courts are moving toward unifying and clarifying 
diverse law by adopting Restatements and Uniform Codes.188 The Exxon Court’s 
inability to reach a decision on derivative liability has thus left application 
inconsistent across the circuits.189 
B. Using Common Law to Subvert a Clearer Due Process Channel 
The Supreme Court wrongfully analyzed Exxon’s challenge to the size of the 
punitive damage award. The Justices preempted the due process issue by granting 
certiorari only to the maritime common law question and ignoring the due process 
argument.190 The Court stated that Exxon’s challenge was “an issue of first 
impression about punitive damages in maritime law,”191 when in reality it was an 

 181. See supra Part II.C. 
 182. Protectus Alpha Navigation Co. v. N. Pac. Grain Growers, Inc., 767 F.2d 1379, 1386 (9th Cir. 1985).  
 183. Id. at 1386.  
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. See supra Part II.A. 
 187. Protectus, 767 F.2d at 1386.  
 188. See, e.g., Fred H. Miller & Duchess Bartmess, Uniform Laws: Possible Useful Tribal Legislation, 36 TULSA 
L.J. 305, 305 (2000) (stating that uniform laws “harmonize” differing laws and “make[] the law more 
intelligible”(quoting WALTER P. ARMSTRONG, JR., A CENTURY OF SERVICE: A CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE 
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 11 (1991))); ALI, About the American 
Law Institute, http://www.ali.org/doc/thisIsALI.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2010) (stating that American law’s two 
chief defects are “its uncertainty and its complexity”). 
 189. See supra Part II.A. (discussing the circuit split on the question of maritime derivative liability). 
 190. See supra note 43; see also Brief in Opposition supra note 86, at 29. 
 191. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2619 (2008). 
NOLTE.PP3.DOC 6/14/2010 6:07 PM 
 Exxon v. Baker: Legislating Spills into the Judiciary 
396 journal of business & technology law 
issue the Court should have decided based on well-settled due process case law192 
and maritime statutes.193 
In an attempt to render an outcome-based decision, the Court distinguished the 
due process cases from the instant case.194 The Court alleged that the due process 
cases were substantively based on state law and federal jurisdiction only arose due 
to the constitutional challenges, while the Court’s jurisdiction in the instant case 
was due to the fact that it was a maritime law challenge.195 On this basis, the Court 
concluded that the punitive damages award must be reviewed under maritime 
common law as opposed to due process law.196 Additionally, the Court asserted that 
federal maritime common law authority precedes and precludes any application of 
the due process standards, which set the outer limit for punitive damages awards.197 
The Court’s reasoning is flawed in several ways. First, the Court should have 
reviewed punitive damages under due process case law because the size of punitive 
damages in this case and other maritime cases, have been treated solely as a due 
process issue.198 Even if the Court was correct that federal maritime common law 
obviates due process case law, then it should have taken into account maritime 
statutes199 and prior federal maritime court decisions, which applied due process 
standards to maritime punitive damages awards.200 Second, the Court did not rely 
on any precedent and ignored maritime statutory law when it essentially usurped 
Congress’s role and legislated a limit on punitive damages.201 The likely motivation 
behind creating an arbitrary limitation was to limit Exxon’s liability, given the 
enormous amount of expenses the company had already incurred.202 As a result of 
the Court’s decision to create a new standard for maritime punitive damages that 
precludes application of due process case law, the Court missed an opportunity to 
clarify the recently muddled Gore guideposts.203 
1. Prior Maritime Cases Used the Gore Guideposts to Evaluate Punitive Damages 
The Court should have used fundamental guideposts announced in Gore to 
determine the appropriate punitive damages without creating a new and arbitrary 

 192. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 193. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 194. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2626. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 2626–27. 
 197. Id. at 2626. 
 198. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 199. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 200. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 201. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 202. See infra Part IV.B.3. 
 203. See infra Part IV.B.4. 
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standard.204 Regardless of how the Court attained jurisdiction, the issue of whether a 
punitive damages award is excessive in maritime law is a due process issue.205 No 
court had ever considered such a “maritime excessiveness argument resembling 
Exxon’s” claim of a maritime common law punitive limit.206 Furthermore, as 
respondents argued, Exxon had likely waived its rights to such a claim in actions in 
the Ninth Circuit because Exxon “told the Ninth Circuit there was no need to reach 
the issue” of punitive damage limitations under maritime law and the lower court 
did not even address the issue.207 Exxon cited to the ability “of [state] common-law 
courts to make rules governing punitive damages” as its argument for a federal 
maritime common law standard.208 However, just because state common law has the 
ability to cap punitive damages,209 does not mean such a cap is required or even 
necessary, particularly when there is no legal history of one.210 
For instance, the Ninth Circuit in the instant case used the Gore guideposts to 
determine that the $5 billion verdict against Exxon was excessive and ultimately cut 
it in half.211 In fact, Exxon had primarily argued on constitutional grounds and the 

 204. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.  
 205. For examples of cases that reached the federal courts through maritime jurisdiction and used due 
process, not common law analysis, see In re Exxon Valdez I, 270 F.3d 1215, 1241–43 (9th Cir. 2001), vacated, 
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008) (analyzing the reprehensibility of Exxon’s actions under 
Gore); CEH, Inc. v. F/V Seafarer, 70 F.3d 694, 705–06 (1st Cir. 1995) (discussing, pre-Gore, that the Supreme 
Court “rejected a ‘mathematical bright line’ approach to the award of punitive damages” (citing Pac. Mut. Life 
Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991))); Silivanch v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 241 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001) (using Gore’s guide-posts in a maritime case to affirm punitive damages of $7 million when the court 
awarded $2.6 million in compensatory damages). 
 206. Brief in Opposition, supra note 86, at 29. 
 207. Id. at 28–29. 
 208. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 43, at 22.  
 209. See generally State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 438 (2003) (Ginsberg, J., 
dissenting) (discussing the ability of states to regulate punitive damages with state statute and common law 
rather than the outer limits used in a constitutional review). 
 210. Brief in Opposition, supra note 86, at 29. Even if the Court was correct in determining that federal 
maritime common law obviates due process law, the Court should only apply an abuse of discretion standard to 
evaluate the lower court’s decision, rather than creating an arbitrary ratio. See Brief for Respondents at 53, 
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008) (No. 07-219) (“When no constitutional issue is raised, the 
role of the appellate court, at least in the federal system, is merely to review the trial court’s determination 
[concerning the size of the award] under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” (quoting Cooper Indus. v. 
Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424, 433 (2001) (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted))). So 
long as a trial court has supported its decision with sufficient evidence and explained “why the award satisfies 
governing standards,” this standard is met. Id. at 54 (citing Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18–25 
(1991)). Further, even if the Court wanted to create a new common-law standard, such a standard “should 
mirror the three [guideposts] that this Court has prescribed as a matter of substantive due process (and which 
themselves are largely derived from common law), so as to ensure that punitive awards receive consistent 
review.” Id. at 57.  
 211. See In Re Exxon Valdez I, 270 F.3d 1215, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001) (remanding and stating the punitive 
award must be reduced in light of BMW and Cooper Industries); In Re Exxon Valdez, 490 F.3d 1066, 1095 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (In Re Exxon Valdez III) (stating that the punitive damages are “not warranted” and reducing them 
to $2.5 billion). 
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Ninth Circuit analyzed the reprehensibility of Exxon’s actions.212 While determining 
“that Exxon’s conduct was reprehensible because it knew of the risk of an oil spill in 
the transportation of huge quantities of oil through the icy waters of Prince William 
Sound[] [a]nd it knew Hazelwood was an alcoholic” the Ninth Circuit stated that 
many “factors reduce reprehensibility” before it remanded the case back to the 
district court to consider a reduction in light of due process cases.213 Thus, the Ninth 
Circuit used the Gore guidepost factors to appropriately limit the punitive damages 
in the instant case.214 
Furthermore, maritime due process case law suggests that bright-line ratios 
should not be used to determine punitive damages. In the pre-Gore maritime case 
CEH, Inc. v. F/V Seafarer, the First Circuit cited non-maritime Supreme Court case 
law that “rejected a ‘mathematical bright line’ approach to the award of punitive 
damages.”215 In CEH, the court refused to reduce punitive damages against a captain 
for $10,000 and against the ship’s owner, for $50,000 when the compensatory 
awards were less than $7000.216 In its analysis, the First Circuit did not investigate 
ratios and standards to apply a separate maritime common law standard.217 
Additionally, maritime cases after Gore used Gore’s due process analysis to affirm 
punitive damages that were not a 1:1 ratio. In Silivanch v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc.,218 
the Southern District of New York refused to overturn a $7 million punitive award 
when the compensatory damages were only $2.6 million for passengers who 
contracted Legionnaires’ Disease on the defendant’s cruise ship.219 The cruise line’s 
conduct was considered “sufficiently wanton” to merit punitive damages when it 
was “aware that [its] whirlpool spas presented [an] increased risk of illness, 
including Legionnaires’ Disease” and that its spas had faulty filters.220 Using the Gore 
guideposts, the court stated the defendants were liable, including that they were 
“sufficiently blameworthy” and that the ratio of compensatory to punitive damages 
was not excessive compared to the harm inflicted.221 
In conclusion, it seems clear that the issue of excessive punitive damages in 
maritime law is a due process issue and maritime courts should use due process case 
law to analyze the excessiveness of punitive damages rather than create an arbitrary 
standard. 

 212. Brief in Opposition, supra note 86, at 25. 
 213. In re Exxon Valdez I, 270 F.3d at 1242.  
 214. Id. at 1240–41. 
 215. 70 F.2d 694, 705–06 (1st Cir. 1995) (citing Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991)). 
 216. Id. at 697–98.  
 217. Id. at 705–06. 
 218. 171 F. Supp. 2d 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 219. Id. at 262–63. 
 220. Id. at 262.  
 221. Id. Notably, the court did not use a different “maritime” standard to determine the validity of the 
punitive award. Id. 
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2. Judicial Activism: Throwing Legislative Intent Overboard 
The Exxon Court essentially legislated a 1:1 ratio despite the fact that there have 
been no prior judicial decisions or congressional action mandating a strict ratio in 
maritime punitive damages.222 The Supreme Court ignored due process cases like 
Gore and State Farm223 when it created a new rule for maritime punitive damages 
and instead examined verbal or quantitative methods used by different states,224 
notably adopted only through legislation.225 In fact, the Court would not even 
address due process case law because it only granted certiorari to the maritime 
common law question.226 
Judicial activism is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as instances where “judges 
allow their personal views about public policy, among other factors, to guide their 
decisions.”227 As Justice Stevens argued in his dissent, maritime law is a mix of 
judicially mandated standards and statutes,228 but the Court should not step into a 
legislative function when “a legislative body . . . [is] better equipped to perform the 
task at hand.”229 Many commentators have urged judicial deference to Congress and 
specifically argued against judicial activism in maritime law and noted (before 
Exxon) that the Supreme Court was providing “substantial deference to Congress’ 
role in fashioning maritime law.”230 Commentators argue for deference, stating that 
while federal courts may supplement legislation, Congress retains “superior 
authority over the development of maritime law” particularly since it has 
“‘legislated extensively in these areas.’”231 
Arguably, Congress legislated all of the punitive restrictions it intended to make 
when it only prohibited punitive damages where there was wrongdoing by the agent 
with the principal’s privity or knowledge in the Limitations Act.232 Any argument 
that maritime common law limited liability should be obviated by the Limitations 

 222. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2637 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting) 
(stating that the majority could not cite one judicial decision where a court imposed a precise ratio).  
 223. See supra Part II.B. 
 224. See Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2623 (majority opinion). 
 225. Id. at 2637 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting) (stating that legislatures, not courts, have adopted 
ratios to limit punitive damages). 
 226. See supra note 43. 
 227. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).  
 228. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2634–35.  
 229. See id. at 2635 (quoting Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 531 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(internal quotations omitted)).  
 230. See, e.g., Craig H. Allen, Introduction: The Osceola After 100 Years: Its Meaning and Effect on Maritime 
Personal Injury Law in the United States, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 605, 613–14 (2003).  
 231. Id. (quoting Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 28 (1990)). 
 232. See Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2635 (discussing the Limitations Act to illustrate that the absence of a statute 
limiting damages of the sort in Exxon indicates that Congress has no desire to create any such “new rule 
restricting the liability of a wrongdoer like Exxon”); see also 46 U.S.C. § 30505 (2006). Exxon did not attempt to 
argue the Limitation Act applied because of the difficulty it would face alleging Captain Hazelwood’s actions 
were not within the company’s “privity or knowledge.” Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2635–36.  
NOLTE.PP3.DOC 6/14/2010 6:07 PM 
 Exxon v. Baker: Legislating Spills into the Judiciary 
400 journal of business & technology law 
Act, where Congress created its own restrictions.233 Furthermore, in the Trans-
Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act (“TAPAA”), Congress capped compensatory 
liability in certain oil spills, but “it did not restrict the availability of punitive 
damages.”234 Additionally, compensatory damages for intangible injuries, such as 
pain and suffering or pure economic loss “absent direct physical damage to 
property or proprietary interest” are historically awarded less-liberally in maritime 
law than other areas, thus providing another good reason not to cap punitive 
damages.235 Essentially, the Exxon Court ignored statutory intent and case law that 
emphasized that “an admiralty court must be vigilant not to overstep the well-
considered boundaries imposed by federal legislation.”236 
Further, the Court fully overstepped its bounds by analyzing empirical data to 
determine the correct ratio to apply, despite numerous decisions that have 
emphasized that Congress should make such analyses.237 The Court’s examination 
of median punitive amounts and state ratios substitutes the will of the judiciary for 
that of Congress, which “is better able to evaluate [such ratios] than is this 
Court.”238 Though the majority argued that “the Judiciary has traditionally taken the 
lead in formulating flexible and fair remedies in the law maritime,”239 the Court 
failed to take into account that Congress had already clearly indicated its 
unwillingness to remove or restrict punitive damages where there is egregiousness 
and wrongdoing.240 Even if there was some ambiguity as to whose role it is to create 
limits on punitive damages, courts agree that deciding remedies should be left up to 
Congress.241 
Additionally, the Court bypassed due process punitive damage case law, which 
specifically states that the judiciary will not adopt a particular ratio.242 Although 
State Farm states that “few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive 
and compensatory damages . . . will satisfy due process,”243 the case does not 

 233. Brief in Opposition, supra note 86, at 29. 
 234. See Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2636.  
 235. See id. at 2636–37 (quoting 1 T. SCHEONBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 14-7 (4th ed. 2004) 
(internal quotations omitted)). “[I]t appears that maritime law continues to treat such [intangible] injuries as 
less than fully compensable, or not compensable at all.” Id. at 2637. “Accordingly, there may be less reason to 
limit punitive damages in this sphere than there would be in any other.” Id. 
 236. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp, 498 U.S. 19, 27 (1990). 
 237. See Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2637–38 & n.7 (arguing that Congress is better apt than the judiciary to analyze 
large quantities of data).  
 238. See id. at 2636.  
 239. See id. at 2630 n.21 (majority opinion).  
 240. See id. at 2635–36 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting) (discussing congressional intent in statutes 
such as the Limitations Act and TAPAA). 
 241. See id. at 2637 n.7 (quoting Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 513 (1982)).  
 242. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 424–25 (2003).  
 243. Id. at 425. 
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foreclose the judiciary from seeking punitive damages beyond that ratio.244 The facts 
of Exxon, particularly the egregiousness of Hazelwood’s actions and Exxon’s pre-
existing knowledge of his alcohol problem, would seemingly be the archetypal case 
in which the court would want to go beyond the single-digit ratio.245 While the 
events in Exxon may not merit the $5 billion reward initially granted, the Ninth 
Circuit considered the “guidepost” factors246and ultimately avoided such a high 
ratio, reducing the award to $2.5 billion.247 The Court’s decision to create a 
maximum 1:1 ratio prevented both the Exxon Court and future maritime courts 
from considering the egregiousness of the case in awarding punitive damages.248 
Thus, by creating a new arbitrary standard, ignoring maritime statutes, and not 
utilizing due process cases that explicitly avoid setting a ratio on punitive damages, 
the Court improperly legislated a maximum 1:1 ratio from the bench.249 
3. The Court Created an Outcome-Based Standard for Limiting Punitive Damages in 
Maritime Cases 
The Court may have been motivated to create a 1:1 ratio in order to prevent Exxon 
from paying more damages when it had already paid billions of dollars to the 
United States government, the State of Alaska, and other plaintiffs.250 The Justices 
set the stage for this ruling by granting certiorari only to the maritime common law 
question251 and ignoring the years of litigation and analysis on due process case law 

 244. See, e.g., EEOC v. Fed. Express Corp., 513 F.3d 360, 377–78 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding that a punitive 
damages award equal to a ratio 12.5 times the compensatory damages award was not a violation of due process).  
 245. See supra Part I (discussing Hazelwood’s alcoholism); see also BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 
575 (1996) (explaining that the “degree of reprehensibility” guidepost is the most important factor in 
determining the reasonableness of a punitive damages award). The State Farm Court described the 
reprehensibility analysis:  
We have instructed courts to determine the reprehensibility of a defendant by considering whether: 
the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; the tortious conduct evinced an indifference 
to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others; the target of the conduct had financial 
vulnerability; the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident; and the harm was 
the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident. 
538 U.S. at 418.  
 246. See In re Exxon Valdez I, 270 F.3d 1215, 1241 (9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit, using the due process 
cases, analyzed the reprehensibility of Exxon’s actions. Id.  
 247. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2614 (2008).  
 248. See id. at 2634 (stating the maximum “punitive-to-compensatory ratio” is now 1:1 in maritime law). 
 249. See id. 
 250. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2613 (discussing the amount of damages Exxon already paid); see Barry Friedman, 
The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 258 (2005) (stating that some analysts argue that judges base 
decisions on “influences . . . other than an independent judgment of the law”). Other influences include policy 
outcomes, for example, that the court did not want Exxon to have to spend any more money on damages than 
they already had. See Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2613.  
 251. See supra note 43. 
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that took place in the Ninth Circuit and district court.252 The Supreme Court’s 
actions are even more confusing because the Ninth Circuit did not analyze the 
maritime common law claim.253 The Court’s decision supports the view of some 
scholars that votes on writs of certiorari to the Supreme Court are “preliminary 
strategic judgments on the merits.”254 In this case, by eliminating the due process 
issue, the Justices could make a more narrowly tailored ruling that would provide 
for substantial limits on punitive damages in this one case and in maritime law, 
without affecting other areas of the law through a due process analysis.255 
Analysts claim that judges are often motivated by external factors, beyond legal 
considerations when making judicial decisions.256 Instead of being “motivated 
primarily to decide cases based upon an independent assessment of the law and 
facts,” judges may make decisions to reach “the outcome they prefer.”257 After 
framing the question to its liking, the Court went out of its way in its opinion to 
detail the significant amount of money that Exxon had already paid stating: “Exxon 
spent around $2.1 billion in cleanup efforts,” and that Exxon settled civil cases by 
paying “$900 million toward restoring natural resources” and “another $303 
million in voluntary settlements.”258 Thus, the Court strongly hinted it was 
concerned that Exxon had, in the Court’s view, paid sufficient damages.259 This 
reasoning may have caused the Court to use maritime common law as an excuse to 
limit punitive damages so that Exxon would be spared additional costs.260 Such an 
argument is compelling in this case because previous maritime case law used the 
due process guidelines without considering common law restrictions.261 
Furthermore, the full impact of this decision is likely to be felt for years, if not 
decades, as parties around the Gulf of Mexico deal with the recent April 20, 2010 BP 
oil spill that continues to destroy pristine environmental wildlife and decimate 

 252. See supra note 43; Brief in Opposition, supra note 86, at 25 (stating that the Ninth Circuit “reviewed the 
Phase III verdict only under the Due Process Clause,” in part because of Exxon’s request to analyze due process 
before any common-law considerations).  
 253. Brief in Opposition, supra note 86, at 29 (“[N]either the district court nor the Ninth Circuit passed on 
the issue [of punitive damage limitations under maritime common law].”). 
 254. H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 12 
(1991). 
 255. See generally Victoria Lockard & Anna A. Summer, United States: Exxon Shipping Company v. Baker: 
Chipping Away At Punitive Damages Awards, MONDAQ BUS. BRIEFING, Aug. 27, 2008 (“The Exxon [sic] decision 
is precedent only in the context of maritime law.”). 
 256. See Friedman, supra note 250, at 270–71. This case note does not allege that the Justices considered 
Justice Alito’s stock ownership when making their decision. See Barnes, supra note 3 (discussing Justice Alito’s 
recusal from the case due to stock ownership in Exxon).  
 257. See Friedman, supra note 250, at 270. 
 258. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2613 (2008). 
 259. See id. 
 260. See id. (citing the numerous payments Exxon had made to attempt the rectify the damage caused by the 
oil spill). See generally Friedman, supra note 250, at 270–71 (discussing potential sources of external influence 
on judicial opinions). 
 261. See supra Part IV.C.1. 
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industries such as commercial fishing.262 The Exxon 1:1 compensatory to punitive 
damages limitation will affect any potential future litigation against BP, such as 
lawsuits claiming that egregious actions led to these current and impending 
economic losses. 263 
4. The Court Should Have Used This Opportunity to Clarify the Gore Guideposts 
Finally, in bypassing a due process analysis, the Court missed an opportunity to 
precisely define the guidelines established in Gore and later modified in Williams.264 
In Williams the Supreme Court stated that harm to non-parties could be considered 
in the reprehensibility of conduct guidepost, but paradoxically stated harm to non-
parties could not be considered.265 Scholars have noted that the Williams case 
created confusion over when harm to a non-party could be used in the punitive 
damage analysis.266 Since the oil spill in the Exxon case caused harm to various non-
parties such as fishermen and Native Alaskans, it would have been an ideal time for 

 262. On April 20, 2010, BP-owned oil rig, Deepwater Horizon, exploded and sunk, spilling thousands of 
gallons of oil daily from its source into the Gulf of Mexico. See generally Next Step to Stop Oil: Throw Garbage at 
It, CNN.COM, May 11, 2010, http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/05/09/gulf.oil/index. Html (discussing the April 20, 
2010 explosion of the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Rig in the Gulf of Mexico and the subsequent oil spill); White 
House Raises Specter of Misconduct in Oil Spill, FOXNEWS.COM, May 5, 2010, http://www.foxnews.com/ 
politics/2010/ 05/05/bp-costs-add [hereinafter White House Raises Spector] (discussing environmental and 
economic repurcussions of the BP oil spill). The oil leak has continued unabated for weeks and as of the date of 
this publication, BP has failed to stop it. White House Raises Spector, supra.  
 263. See White House Raises Spector, supra note 262. Many commentators have stated concerns that BP 
cannot be held liable for more than $75 million in economic losses because of restrictions under the Oil 
Pollution Act of 1990, which was passed after the Exxon Valdez spill. Id.; see also Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. 
L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.). However, the cap on 
economic damages does not apply “if somebody is found to be either grossly negligent, conduct willful— 
involved in willful misconduct, or in violation of federal regulations.” White House Raises Spector, supra note 
262 (quoting White House Communications Director, Dan Pfeiffer). Thus, if BP’s actions were egregious 
enough to implicate punitive liability for the oil spill, parties could seek compensatory damages higher than $75 
million, but they would still be restricted by the 1:1 compensatory to punitive damages ratio mandated by 
Exxon. While an investigation into the cause of the spill is still ongoing, any punitive damages claims that could 
arise from it will thus be limited. 
 264. 549 U.S. 346 (2007). 
 265. Id. at 355. 
 266. See Parcells, supra note 104, at 27. Parcells laments: 
The Baker [sic] case presented an opportunity to clarify how a judge is to instruct a jury with 
respect to whether harm to third parties (parties other than the plaintiffs) can be considered by a 
jury when determining the reprehensibility of the offense and if punitive damages are warranted, 
but then to disregard that information in determining the amount of the award. However, since the 
Supreme Court in Baker specifically refused to address the due process claim asserted by Exxon . . . 
the due process issue on punitive damages awards will continue to confuse juries, judges and 
practitioners alike.  
Id. 
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the Court to clarify a confusing Gore guidepost.267 Such clarification will have to be 
addressed in a future case, leaving lower courts without direction for now.268 
Thus, the Court created a new standard to prevent higher costs for Exxon rather 
than relying on sufficient due process guidelines that had aided earlier maritime 
court decisions and missed an opportunity to clarify confusing case law about when 
non-parties may bring punitive damage claims.269 
v. conclusion 
The Exxon Court’s failure to reach a majority on the issue of punitive derivative 
liability prevented the Court from resolving a circuit split over the rule for 
derivative liability by adopting a uniform Restatement rule on derivative liability.270 
Further, by framing the issue solely on maritime common law, the Court did not 
follow punitive damages due process case law,271 but rather, arbitrarily limited 
punitive damages to a 1:1 ratio with compensatory damages when the Court should 
have deferred to Congress instead of legislating from the bench.272 In reaching its 
decision, the Exxon Court missed an opportunity to clarify confusing due process 
case law273 and has potentially given the maritime industry an easier standard on 
damages than other industries.274 For instance, any punitive claims by commercial 
fisherman or other injured plaintiffs from the recent 2010 BP Gulf of Mexico oil 
spill will be restricted by the Exxon rule.275 Innocent parties with punitive damages 
claims may feel the full impact of the Supreme Court’s decision to mandate a 1:1 
ratio between compensatory and punitive damages in maritime law, as punitive 
damages against BP, if found responsible for any egregious actions, will be severely 
limited.276 Time will tell if this limit on punitive damages will serve as less of a 
deterrent against tortious behavior by the maritime industry than its land-based 
counterparts, but in an effort to limit damages against Exxon,277 the Court legislated 
a ratio that only stirs the already stormy seas of punitive-damage analysis. 
 

 267. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2611 (stating that the issues presented in the case involve analysis of punitive 
damages). 
 268. See Parcells, supra note 104 at 27–28. 
 269. See supra Part IV.B.1 
 270. See supra Part IV.A. 
 271. See supra Part IV.B.1. 
 272. See supra Part IV.B.2. 
 273. See supra Part IV.B.4. 
 274. See generally Lockard & Summer, supra note 255. 
 275. See supra Part IV.B.3. 
 276. See supra Part IV.B.3. 
 277. See supra Part IV.B.3. 
